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The topic of the paper is the public reception of Gottlob Frege’s (1848–1925) Begriffsschrift
right after its publication in 1879. According to a widespread conception, the reception of
the book was ‘‘unfavorable’’ and even ‘‘tragic.’’ The aim of the paper is to correct this
exaggerated and even false view. The arguments are based, above all, on the six journal
reviews of Frege’s book in 1879 and 1880, and on Leonhard Rabus’s critical comment on it
in his book Die neuesten Bestrebungen auf dem Gebiete der Logik bei den Deutschen und die
logische Frage (1880). The conclusion is that it is misleading to regard the reception of Frege’s
first work as unfair and hostile even though it is apparent that some reviewers of the book
were rather poorly motivated to comment on the Begriffsschrift.  1998 Academic Press
Der Gegenstand dieses Beitrags ist die o¨ffentliche Rezeption von Gottlob Freges (1848–
1925) Begriffsschrift nach ihrer Publikation 1879. Nach einer weitverbreiteten Auffassung war
die Rezeption ‘‘ungu¨nstig,’’ sogar ‘‘tragisch.’’ Ziel des Beitrags ist es zu zeigen, dass solche
Interpretationen u¨berspannt, teilweise sogar falsch sind. Der Verfasser gru¨ndet seine Behaup-
tung vor allem auf die Rezensionen, die in verschiedenen Zeitschriften in den Jahren 1879
und 1880 erschienen sind. Er benutzt auch den Kommentar von Leonhard Rabus Die neuesten
Bestrebungen auf dem Gebiete der Logik bei den Deutschen und Die logische Frage (1880).
Die Untersuchung kommt zu dem Schluss, dass, obwohl offensichtlich einige Rezensenten
dem Buch eher ablehnend gegenu¨berstanden, es irrefu¨hrend ist, von einer ungerechtfertigten
oder abweisenden Rezeption der Fregeschen Begriffsschrift zu sprechen  1998 Academic Press
AMS subject classification: 00A30, 01A55, 03A05.
Key Words: Frege; Begriffsschrift; history of logic; universal language.
If it is the task of philosophy to break the power of the word over the
human mind, uncovering illusions which through the use of language often
almost undeniably arise concerning the relations of concepts, freeing
thought from that which only the nature of the linguistic means of expression
attaches to it, then my Begriffsschrift, further developed for these purposes,
can become a useful tool for philosophers. . . .
The mere invention of this Begriffsschrift, it seems to me, has advanced
logic. I hope that logicians, if they do not allow themselves to be frightened
off by the first impression of unfamiliarity, will not refuse their assent to
the innovations to which I have been driven by a necessity inherent in the
subject matter itself.
Frege, Begriffsschrift [7, VI–VII; 17, 106]1
* E-mail: risto.vilkko@helsinki.fi.
1 I have replaced Terrell Bynum’s translation ‘‘ ‘conceptual notation’ ’’ with the original ‘‘Begriffs-
schrift’’ because in the following I refer to Frege’s book in italics (Begriffsschrift) and to the formula
language itself in roman letters (Begriffsschrift).
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As these few lines from Gottlob Frege’s (1848–1925) preface to his Begriffsschrift
(1879) [7] show, the author himself was well aware of the somewhat peculiar
character of his notation and of at least some of the ideas presented by means of
it. Especially after the publication of his second book, Die Grundlagen der Arith-
metik (1884) [10], Frege understood quite well that, on the one hand, most philoso-
phers might consider his writings incomprehensible because of their mathematical
aspects—and, on the other hand, most mathematicians might recoil from them
because of their philosophical considerations. Even if Frege had not expected an
altogether enthusiastic reception for his book, he may have hoped for a little bit
more recognition than he, in fact, received (cf. [39, 58]). He had outlined his logicistic
programme of disclosing the evidence for arithmetical knowledge by the foundations
of pure logic already at the time of publication of the Begriffsschrift. Hence, after
accomplishing the first part of the programme, i.e., after reducing the concept of
ordering-in-a-sequence to the notion of logical ordering, Frege most probably had
planned to move on, without any delay, to defining the basic arithmetical concepts
(such as, e.g., number, magnitude, equality in number) solely by means of logical
concepts—and then to prove the basic laws of arithmetic with the help of these
definitions and the axioms of logic (cf. [13]).
However, immediately after its publication, the Begriffsschrift was reviewed in
(only) six journals and by Leonhard Rabus in his book Die neuesten Bestrebungen
auf dem Gebiete der Logik bei den Deutschen und die logische Frage [35] in 1880.
Instead of proceeding as he had hoped to do, Frege dedicated the following three
to four years to giving answers to his critics and defending his program.
In this paper, I shall examine these reviews and comments. I shall try to estimate
whether the reception of the Begriffsschrift really was as poor as Terrell W. Bynum,
among others, has suggested. In his biographical introduction to Frege, Bynum
speaks of ‘‘at least six . . . disappointing reviews’’ [2, 15–21]. He leaves out Rabus’s
comments even though he refers to Rabus’s book [35] elsewhere.
Two years after its publication, the Begriffsschrift had been reviewed/commented
upon seven times altogether. Was six plus one really such a bad result for the book?
It might well seem so—now that we have learned to consider the Begriffsschrift as
one of the most important contributions to the history of logic. However, during
the late 1870s, Frege was far from the fame he has gained during the past hundred
years. In those days he certainly was not known as a famous logician–philosopher
whose work revolutionized the history of logic. After the publication of the
Begriffsschrift, it took quite a long time before he was recognized as the father of
modern logic. The Begriffsschrift was the first monograph of a relatively unknown
young mathematician (cf. [35, 130]) who was interested in the foundations of mathe-
matics. Even with a longer perspective, Frege cannot be considered as one of the
most notable mathematicians of his time. One need only compare him to such 19th-
century mathematicians as Karl Weierstrass (1815–1897), Georg Cantor (1845–
1918), Felix Klein (1849–1925), and Henri Poincare´ (1854–1912) [31, 73]. His earlier
contributions—his doctoral dissertation, Ueber eine geometrische Darstellung der
imagina¨ren Gebilde in der Ebene [5], and the Habilitationsschrift, Rechnungsmetho-
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den, die sich auf eine Erweiterung des Gro¨ssenbegriffes gru¨nden [6]—were no more
celebrated than an average dissertation was in those days (or has been ever since).
Apparently, no reviews of his dissertations were published [31, 71–72]. Even after
Frege had become established as the father of modern logic, Fregean scholars have
paid only marginal attention to these contributions.2 (On the Fregean revolution
in logic, see, e.g., [34].)
It is illuminating to compare the reception of the Begriffsschrift with that of
Edmund Husserl’s Philosophie der Arithmetik (1891) [24]. Husserl’s situation was
in many respects the same as Frege’s. The Philosophie der Arithmetik was the first
monograph of a 32-year-old mathematician–philosopher, and it was published four
years after his Habilitationsschrift. The Begriffsschrift was published five years after
Frege’s Habilitationsschrift, and he was then 31 years old. Comparatively, I would
say, in the early 1890s Husserl was just as well known in academic circles as Frege
was in the late 1870s. Frege’s book, though, received more reviews than Husserl’s:
apparently the Philosophie der Arithmetik was reviewed no more than twice!3
If we keep in mind that the Begriffsschrift was the first monograph of a young
mathematician and compare its success to that of Husserl’s first work, six plus one
reviews was really not such a bad result. A few of them were, it is true, not too
carefully prepared (above all [40; 42]). Some of them, however, were written quite
carefully and bona fide though it happens, every now and then, that even the more
sympathetic critics shoot a little off the target (cf. [29; 30; 37]).
The authors of these six journal reviews were the following: the mathematician
and philosopher, Reinhold Hoppe [23] (in Archiv der Mathematik und Physik), the
philosopher-pedagogue and novelist,4 Kurd Lasswitz [29] (in Jenaer Literaturzeit-
ung), the philosopher and mathematician, Paul Tannery [40] (in Revue philoso-
phique de la France et de l’e´tranger), the pedagogue and philosopher, Karl Michae¨lis
[30] (in Zeitschrift fu¨r Vo¨lkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft), the mathemati-
cian and logician, Ernst Schro¨der [37] (in Zeitschrift fu¨r Mathematik und Physik),
and the philosopher, John Venn [42] (in Mind).5
The one and one-half pages in Rabus’s book about Frege and his Begriffsschrift
differ from the other essays. Rabus’s discussion is more like a critical note or a
comment rather than a review. Rabus’s remarks resemble those of Venn in general
tone, which is somewhat sour [35, 130–131].
In his introductory survey of the life and work of Frege, Bynum regards all of
these writings as more or less poorly oriented and misguided [2, 15–21, 75–78].
This kind of view holds quite well in the case of Tannery and Hoppe (as I shall
2 On [5], see [36]. And on [6], see [1] and [20].
3 The Philosophie der Arithmetik was reviewed by A. Elsas in Philosophische Monatshefte 30 and by
Frege in Zeitschrift fu¨r Philosophie und philosophische Kritik 103 [28, 242]. See also [38, 29–44; 4].
4 Lasswitz’s fame as a novelist is based largely on his book, Auf zwei Planeten (1897), which belongs
to the early science-fiction category.
5 English translations from the review essays by Hoppe, Lasswitz, Tannery, Michae¨lis, and Schro¨der
can be found in [17] (also a reprint of Venn’s review is included). I quote these essays in Terrell Bynum’s
translations (with minor changes).
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show in the following), although there is also a lot of good criticism in these
papers, and I would like to use the characterization ‘‘poorly motivated’’ rather
than ‘‘misguided.’’
The reviews vary greatly in substance and in length. However, there are certain
important similarities between them. Two major points of criticism are basically
shared by all reviewers. The first one arises from Frege’s idiosyncratic and original
‘‘two-dimensional’’ notation. The second one is more external: most of the critics
of the Begriffsschrift were mesmerized by the fact that Frege almost totally ignored
what had been happening in the field of logic and foundations of mathematics
during the first three quarters of the 19th century. More than anything, they tried
to remind Frege of the results achieved in algebra of logic (or logical algebra) both
in Britain and in Germany—by George Boole, William Stanley Jevons, and Hugh
McColl, on the one hand, and by Robert Grassmann and Ernst Schro¨der, on the
other hand (see [33; 34]). Among the reviewers, only one paid attention to the
difference between Frege’s approach and that of the algebraists (see below).
Let us now take a closer look at precisely what the reviewers said. I shall quote
their papers quite extensively in order to avoid misinterpretations as far as possible.
First of all, the critics disliked the formal notation of the Begriffsschrift. Venn
considered the notation, which made ‘‘a strange and chilling impression’’ on Mi-
chae¨lis [30, 232; 17, 212], as ‘‘cumbrous and inconvenient’’ [42, 297] and Tannery
as ‘‘excessively complex’’ [40, 108; 17, 233]. Hoppe, in turn, exclaimed that ‘‘we
doubt that anything has been gained by the invented formula language itself’’ [23,
44; 17, 209]. Schro¨der was not favorable toward Frege’s novelty—it appeared to
him a ‘‘monstrous waste of space’’ [37, 91; 17, 229]. Rabus also was quite convinced
that the mere breaking of tradition by inventing a new way of formalizing would
not do any good to logic in general [35, 131].
Schro¨der was the only one of these critics to provide convincing evidence for his
censure. His argument is as follows: The formal presentation of a simple exclusively
interpreted disjunctive judgment (‘‘a is true or b is true but not both’’) is much
easier to grasp when presented in the algebraic notation than by means of the
Begriffsschrift—even though the latter notation is, perhaps, more pleasant to the
eye.
The (Schro¨der) algebraic version is
ab1 1 a1b 5 1 (or alternatively: ab 1 a1b1 5 0)6
and the Fregean version [37, 89]7 is
a
b .
b
a
6 The subscript 1 stands for negation.
7 An alternative way of formalizing the judgment in the Begriffsschrift can be found in [7, 12].
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Lasswitz was a little bit more gentle as he criticized only the choice of the
name of the system, for purely philosophical reasons. He wrote that ‘‘calling the
Begriffsschrift ‘a formula language of pure thought’ could obviously frighten off
those, like the reviewer, who cannot believe in the existence of a pure thought
which would be possible without a definite content. It must be said, that [the
apparent difficulty] here is only a matter of a partially unfortunate choice of expres-
sion’’ [29, 248; 17, 211]. Schro¨der also considered the name ‘‘Begriffsschrift’’ (‘‘con-
ceptual notation’’) as somewhat misplaced—in his opinion the name of Frege’s
book should have been ‘‘Urtheilsschrift’’ (‘‘judgmental notation’’) [37, 87]. In
Frege’s defence it can be said that he adopted the name for his book from Adolf
Trendelenburg’s essay, U¨ber Leibnizens Entwurf einer allgemeinen Charakteristik
[41], where Trendelenburg used the term ‘‘Begriffsschrift’’ as synonymous with the
term ‘‘universal language’’ [19, XXIV; 21, 28–29].
Even though the Begriffsschrift is quite an elegant system, not only aesthetically
but also economically, it is not surprising that not a single respectable logician ever
adopted the Begriffsschrift as his or her standard of formalizing. By economic
elegance I mean the use of only two basic judgmental relations, the semantics of
which equal the semantics of the connectives nowadays known as material implica-
tion and negation. Schro¨der did not see this kind of economy as an advantage. He
saw the reduction of the ‘‘connectives’’ to two basic ones as verging ‘‘upon pedantry’’
[37, 90; 17, 228]. In a sense Schro¨der is right: the more concentrated the notational
apparatus is, the more clumsy it is in practice. It is well known, for example, that
all connectives of a propositional calculus can be defined by means of one single
connective—either by the Peirce arrow (pQq, i.e., ‘‘neither p nor q’’) or by the
Sheffer stroke (puq, i.e., ‘‘not both p and q’’)—but these connectives are quite
impossible to handle in practice.8
From the notational apparatus of the Begriffsschrift only one symbol has survived
as a generally acknowledged and understood tool for condense formalizing, i.e.,
the turnstile `, which is a symbol that recognizes the conceptual content of a
judgment as a fact. Hence `a reads: ‘‘a is a fact’’ [7, 3–4]. Bertrand Russell and
Alfred N. Whitehead, among others, adopted this symbol. They used it the same
way as Frege did, even though they called it the assertion sign. The symbol thus
owes at least part of its fame to Russell just as Frege himself does.9
The other major point of criticism common to almost all of the reviewers (exclud-
ing only Tannery and Hoppe) was Frege’s lack of reference to the work of his
predecessors in the field of the foundations of mathematics, above all, George Boole.
Michae¨lis considered it ‘‘regrettable that Frege takes no notice at all of the
previously existing works on the same subject. I mean the investigations of Boole,
Jevons, Schro¨der, MacColl, and others—partly seeking to solve exactly the same
problems as Frege’’ [30, 240; 17, 218]. Schro¨der held the same opinion:
8 Charles S. Peirce was already aware of this possibility in the early 1880s, but it was mentioned in
a publication for the first time in 1913 by Henry M. Sheffer [2, 70, note].
9 The same symbol has also been used for quite different purposes. For example, Stephen C. Kleene
has used it as a ‘‘deducibility relation’’ [27, 89 and passim].
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First of all, I consider it a shortcoming that the book is presented in too isolated a manner
and not only seeks no serious connection with achievements that have been made in essentially
similar directions—namely those of Boole—but even disregards them entirely. [37, 83; 17, 220]
John Venn’s review of the Begriffsschrift was the most hostile of all, in many
different ways. Even though Venn admitted that ‘‘I have not made myself sufficiently
familiar with Dr. Frege’s system’’ [42, 297], he did not hesitate to exclaim that
. . . it does not seem to me that Dr. Frege’s scheme can for a moment compare with that of
Boole. I should suppose, from his making no reference to the latter, that he has not seen it,
nor any of the modifications of it with which we are familiar here. Certainly the merits which
he claims as novel for his own method are common to every symbolic method. [42, 297]
Lasswitz’s review can be considered as an opposite to Venn’s as it is, in general,
quite sympathetic to its target. Even Schro¨der referred to it as a ‘‘very kindly written
review’’ [37, 83; 17, 220]. Of all the critics, Lasswitz was the only one to notice the
fundamental difference between the approach of the Boolean algebraists and that
of Frege. This difference can be illuminated quite well in the Leibnizian terms of
calculus ratiocinator and lingua rationalis. Boole’s system is a categorical example
of the former, i.e., of a formal logical system in which the laws of logic appear as
symbolized operational rules. As Frege himself has said, Boole’s formula language
solves only a part of the Leibnizian project of a universal language [16, 14]. The
Begriffsschrift is, however, not only a calculus ratiocinator. It is essentially a universal
language that is meant to represent the structure of the expressed conceptual
contents very thoroughly and explicitly. This fits well with Leibniz’s dream of a
lingua rationalis, i.e., of creating an exact symbolic system which would be able to
present not only the basic structure of judgments and concepts, but also the structure
of the thought itself.10 Cf., e.g., [21, 36; 22, IX–XVII; 32, 10]; see also [26, 61–63].
Lasswitz wrote:
Now English logicians, first Boole and then Jevons building upon him, have derived from the
language of algebra the purely logical operations holding for concepts in general and have
based a conceptual calculus upon them. In Germany, the works of R. Grassmann and E.
Schro¨der are in this field. . . . It is thus gratifying to encounter in the present work [Begriffsschrift]
an attempt to attack this problem in a different way. [29, 248; 17, 210]
Concerning Frege’s lack of reference to his predecessors—more precisely, to the
algebraists of logic—and the fact that the presentation of Frege and his Begriffs-
schrift in Rabus’s book [35, 130–131] follows immediatedly after a favorable com-
mentary on the results of the German algebraists [35, 125–129],11 it is not difficult
to imagine that Rabus was referring to the same Boolean–Schro¨derian tradition
as the journal reviewers when he characterized Frege’s book as ‘‘a more or less
comprehensive subsequent summary of the already existent work’’ [35, 131]. Rabus
10 Leibniz also entertained the idea of making use of the lingua rationalis as an ‘‘algebra of concepts’’
(cf. calculus rationalis).
11 Rabus discusses above all the results of the brothers Hermann and Robert Grassmann, and barely
mentions Schro¨der. He refers also to their English colleagues (Boole and Jevons) but does not comment
on their work in detail (cf. the name of his book) [35, 125].
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also disliked, perhaps more than the others, Frege’s treatment of the Kantian table
of judgmental forms [see 25, A 70–76, B 95–101].
Lasswitz’s review was also influential concerning Frege’s academic career. In
1879, soon after the publication of the Begriffsschrift, Frege was promoted to the
position of Extraordinarius (außerordentlicher Professor) in mathematics at the
University of Jena. The credit for this belongs not only to Frege himself, but also
to his teacher and friend, the famous mathematician and scientist Ernst Abbe
(1840–1905), whose efforts and recommendation ensured the promotion. The for-
mal qualifications for the title included publication of a scientific monograph. Hence,
as Werner Stelzner has pointed out in his book, Gottlob Frege: Jena und die Geburt
der modernen Logik [39], the reception of the Begriffsschrift must have played a
significant role in Frege’s promotion [39, 57–60]. When the promotion was under
consideration, the somewhat restrained reception of Frege’s book at the Philosophi-
cal Faculty had not passed unnoticed by the Curator of the University, Baron
(Freiherr) August von Tu¨rcke. Von Tu¨rcke was convinced that the reason for this
was inadequate understanding of the book. Therefore he chose to inform, in a
letter, the Ministry of State in Weimar of Lasswitz’s review essay. He wrote: ‘‘In
Jenaer Literaturzeitung (1879, vol. 18) you shall find a decisively favorable review
on Frege’s ‘Begriffsschrift’ written by Laßwitz in Gotha’’ (cited in [39, 60]). This
detail suggests that very likely Lasswitz’s review also had a role to play in Frege’s
promotion to the position of Extraordinarius.
Randall R. Dipert writes in his detailed article on Schro¨der’s life and work
[3] that ‘‘[w]hile Schro¨der’s attitude toward Frege suggests slight irritation and
frustration, it should be kept in mind that Frege’s own views, . . . , suggest real
bitterness and outrage toward a variety of figures (such as . . . the Booleans, although
not toward Schro¨der by name) whose positions he did not understand well or had
not carefully studied’’ [3, 24–25; see also 12]. Although it is possible to make a
variety of different suggestions concerning Frege’s opinion of the Booleans, there
can be no doubt that Frege understood Boolean algebra of logic reasonably well.
Frege wrote (and also published in part) at least three articles which show his
competence in Boolean logic. Frege delivered the first one of them, ‘‘Ueber den
Zweck der Begriffsschrift,’’ before the Jenaische Gesellschaft fu¨r Medicin und Natur-
wissenschaft on 27 January, 1882 in order to answer his critics and to show why he
could not possibly have applied the Leibnizian–Boolean notation in the Begriffs-
schrift. This paper was published in a supplement to the Jenaische Zeitschrift fu¨r
Naturwissenschaft which consisted of the preceding minutes of the Jenaische Gesell-
schaft fu¨r Medicin und Naturwissenschaft [9]. The other two papers were the brilliant
essays ‘‘Booles rechnende Logik und die Begriffsschrift’’ (1880/81) and ‘‘Booles
logische Formelsprache und meine Begriffsschrift’’ (1882).12 In these two essays,
he examined very carefully the aims and the properties of Begriffsschrift parallel
to those of Boolean algebra of logic.
12 The latter article can be considered an abbreviated version of the former. Frege wrote it after the
former article had been rejected by all three journals he sent it to. The latter article was also rejected.
These essays were only published in 1969 [16, 9–59].
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The most important philosophical reason Frege had not applied Boole’s notation
concerned the distinction between individuals and concepts. Boole’s letters always
refer to extensions of concepts and never to individuals. For Frege, this distinc-
tion—in other words, the distinction between proper names and function names—
was crucial. Another major difference was methodological. The method of Boolean
algebraists proceeds from concepts to judgments (and further on to proofs) whereas
Frege’s starting point was judgments themselves [16, 15–17, 53–54]. These topics
are beyond the scope of this paper.
Terrell Bynum has the same opinion as Dipert. In his short biography of Frege
[2], Bynum writes that Schro¨der and Venn ‘‘seem to be right’’ in suggesting in their
review essays that, when writing the Begriffsschrift, Frege was unaware of the
existence of Boole and his work [2, 18, 77–78]. Bynum assumes that Frege became
acquainted with Boolean logic only after reading Schro¨der’s review and thereafter
wrote his long and detailed paper, ‘‘Booles rechnende Logik und die Begriffsschrift.’’
As evidence for his assumption, Bynum refers to the lecture courses in mathematics
that Frege attended during his university studies at Jena and Go¨ttingen. According
to Bynum, these courses dealt solely with geometry and functional analysis [2, 77].
However, I would be very surprised if Frege had absolutely no idea of Boole’s
contributions when preparing his Begriffsschrift. Certainly, Frege must have also
learned about mathematics outside classrooms. Moreover, the time span between
Frege’s doctoral dissertation and the publication of the Begriffsschrift was six years.
I do not believe it possible that Frege wrote his Begriffsschrift in isolation and
showed no other interest in the foundations of mathematics during those years.
If it is true, however, that Frege did not know any Boolean logic (as suggested
in [2, 77]) before he read Schro¨der’s review, then he surely was quite fast in learning,
considering the fact that he wrote ‘‘Booles rechnende Logik und die Begriffsschrift’’
in the same year as Schro¨der’s review was published, i.e., in 1880. In this connection
it must be admitted, though, that very likely Frege’s discussion on Boolean logic
was motivated by Schro¨der’s criticism.
I conclude that half of the writers of the Begriffsschrift reviews, namely, Tannery,
Hoppe, and Venn, were not really interested in Frege’s book. However, the re-
maining three reviewers—Schro¨der, Michae¨lis, and Lasswitz—were not so bad at
all. The sympathetic attitude of Lasswitz and Michae¨lis is reflected in the follow-
ing quotations:
This book is small, but carefully thought through. It is obviously the result of long, toilsome
work and highly recommended to all of those interested as a valuable contribution to the
history of thinking. [29, 249; 17, 212]
After a repeated study of Frege’s book, however, we can say from the beginning that the
diligence, the acuteness and the consistency with which he has elaborated his system deserves
admiration. We hope that the author’s efforts may have thorough study and wider circulation
among intellectuals; and we do not doubt that his work will find application within the limits
which he himself indicates and will contribute to the improvement or assurance of scientific
method. [30, 213; 17, 233]
420 RISTO VILKKO HM 25
Even though Schro¨der’s review contained a lot of hard criticism, the conclusion is
not hostile. He wrote that ‘‘[m]y comments, . . . , have the overall effect of encourag-
ing the author to further his research, rather than discourage him’’ [37, 93; 17, 231].
His general experience of Frege’s book cannot be regarded as anything but positive:
The book is clearly and refreshingly written and also rich in perceptive comments. The examples
are pertinent; and I read with genuine pleasure nearly all the secondary discussions which
accompany Frege’s theory; for example, the excellently written Preface. [37, 82; 17, 220]
Schro¨der had even read the Begriffsschrift carefully enough to find one slight error
in the first chapter of the book [37, 88; cf. 7, 7].13
Hoppe also thought that ‘‘[o]n the whole, the book, as suggestive and pioneering,
is worthwhile’’ [23, 45; 17, 210]. These words can, of course, be regarded as more
or less empty. But this still leaves Venn as the only one who had absolutely nothing
positive to say about Frege’s book. Dipert also remarks that in comparison to
the general (critical) tone of the scientific reviews of late 19th-century Germany,
Schro¨der’s Begriffsschrift review appears quite balanced and fair [3, 24]. And in
comparison to the tone of Frege’s criticism of Husserl’s Philosophie der Arithmetik,
with its references to Husserl’s ‘‘philosophical disease’’ (psychologism) [11, 332],
etc., Schro¨der’s way of putting his words really is quite polite. The same also holds
for the other reviews of Frege’s book—excluding only John Venn.
On the basis of what has been said above, it is hard to see how the reception of
Begriffsschrift can be regarded as ‘‘tragic’’ and ‘‘unfavorable,’’ as suggested by
Bynum [2, 17, 76]. The reception could certainly have been much worse.
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